for the Bankruptcy Estate of Arturo Gonzalez, 17 Plaintiff, Vs. Plaintiff, Vs. CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE COMPLAIN TO REVOKE THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE FOR FRAUD UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1); AND (2) THE SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE COMPLAINT TO REVOKE THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE FOR	Case 2:16-ap-01037-RK Doc 123 Filed 03/27/19 Entered 03/27/19 17:21:45 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 50		
ARTURO GONZALEZ, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr., Debtor. WESLEY H. AVERY, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Arturo Gonzalez, Plaintiff, Vs. ARTURO GONZALEZ, an individual, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr., Defendant. Plaintiff and Chapter 7 Trustee, Wesley H. Avery ("Plaintiff" or "Trustee"), to revoke the Chapter 7 Adv. No. 2:16-ap-01037-RK Chapter 7 Adv. No. 2:16-ap-01037-RK FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW AFTER TRIAL ON (1) THE SIXT CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE COMPLAIN TO REVOKE THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE FOR FRAUD UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1); AND (2) THE SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE COMPLAINT TO REVOKE THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE FOR FRAUDULENT ACQUISITION OF ESTAT ASSETS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) Trial Date: January 11 and 12, 2018 Time: 9:00 a.m. Place: Courtroom 1675 Roybal Federal Building 255 East Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 The trial on the sixth and seventh claims for relief in the complaint filed by the Plaintiff and Chapter 7 Trustee, Wesley H. Avery ("Plaintiff" or "Trustee"), to revoke the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	UNITED STATES BA	CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT Central District of California BY penning DEPUTY CLERK UBLICATION ANKRUPTCY COURT CT OF CALIFORNIA
WESLEY H. AVERY, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Arturo Gonzalez, Plaintiff, Plaintiff, Vs. ARTURO GONZALEZ, an individual, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr., Defendant. Defendant. Plaintiff and Chapter 7 Trustee, Wesley H. Avery ("Plaintiff" or "Trustee"), to revoke the process of the	11 12	ARTURO GONZALEZ, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art	Chapter 7
WESLEY H. AVERY, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Arturo Gonzalez, Plaintiff, Plaintiff, Vs. ARTURO GONZALEZ, an individual, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr., Defendant. Defendant. Defendant. WESLEY H. AVERY, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Arturo Gonzalez, Trustee, Wesley H. Avery ("Plaintiff" or "Trustee"), to revoke the		Debtor.	FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCI USIONS
Plaintiff and Chapter 7 Trustee, Wesley H. Avery ("Plaintiff" or "Trustee"), to revoke the	17 18 19 20 21 22 23	for the Bankruptcy Estate of Arturo Gonzalez, Plaintiff, vs. ARTURO GONZALEZ, an individual, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr.,	OF LAW AFTER TRIAL ON (1) THE SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE COMPLAINT TO REVOKE THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE FOR FRAUD UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1); AND (2) THE SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE COMPLAINT TO REVOKE THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE FOR FRAUDULENT ACQUISITION OF ESTATE ASSETS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) Trial Date: January 11 and 12, 2018 Time: 9:00 a.m. Place: Courtroom 1675 Roybal Federal Building 255 East Temple Street
	25	·	
\sim			
fraud under Section 727(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, United States Code -1-			

(U.S.C.), and to revoke Debtor's discharge for knowing and fraudulent acquisition of Estate assets under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) was held on January 11 and 12, 2018. Plaintiff appeared at trial by Brett B. Curlee, of the Law Offices of Brett Curlee, through attorney Brett B. Curlee. Defendant, who is self-represented, appeared at trial for himself.

Having considered the Complaint of Plaintiff (Adversary No. 2:16-ap-01037-RK, Docket No. 1), Plaintiff's trial brief (Docket No. 53), Plaintiff's trial declarations (Docket No. 54), the Notice of Designation of John J. Menchaca as the Accounting Expert for the Plaintiff (Docket No. 52), the Answer of Defendant to the Complaint (Docket No. 21), the trial exhibits of Plaintiff and Defendant and Defendant's declaration presented at the time of trial, and the testimony of witnesses and oral arguments of Plaintiff's Counsel and Defendant at trial, and having found that there were no objections to Plaintiff's declarations and trial exhibits, and that there were objections by Plaintiff to evidence submitted by Defendant, which are discussed herein, where appropriate, the court hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.¹

I. <u>FINDINGS OF FACT</u>

1. On October 5, 2015, Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C, which commenced this bankruptcy case entitled *In re Arturo Gonzalez, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr.*, Case No. 2:15-bk-25283-RK ("Bankruptcy Case"). Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits ("Ex. P-xx"), Petition, Ex. P-3. On the "Schedule B-Personal Property" ("Schedule B") to the Petition, Debtor listed his business Long Beach Realty, Inc. ("Long Beach Realty") as an asset and identified its assets as \$1,100 in Long Beach Realty's bank account, \$9,500 in accounts receivable,

¹ The court has reviewed and adopted in part proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by Trustee but has conducted its own independent review of the testimony and evidence received at trial, and the court has substantially modified the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to reflect its independent views of the case.

and \$400 in business equipment. Petition, Ex. P-3, p. 38.2 On the "Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt" ("Schedule C"), Debtor claimed an exemption in the amount of \$10,600 pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) § 703.140(b)(5) in the value of Long Beach Realty's assets. Petition, Ex. P-3, p. 42. On page 3 of Debtor's bankruptcy petition filed on October 5, 2015, he signed an oath "declar[ing] under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this petition is true and correct," which information included the information listed on the bankruptcy schedules attached thereto. Petition, Ex. P-3, p. 28.

- 2. At trial, Debtor argued that he disclosed everything he needed to disclose on the date that he filed his bankruptcy case on October 5, 2015. Trial Transcript (January 12, 2018) (hereinafter "Day 2 TT") (Docket No. 94), 40:3-23. That statement is not true because as discussed below, Debtor did not disclose all of his prepetition assets which belonged to the bankruptcy estate in this case on his petition and bankruptcy schedules as required by the Bankruptcy Code. *See Cusano v. Klein,* 264 F.3d 926, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing, *inter alia,* 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(l) and 541(a)(1)).
- 3. On cross-examination at trial, Debtor, a licensed California real estate broker, California Bureau of Real Estate No. 01207677, testified that when he filed his bankruptcy petition, there were sales commissions pending on sales transactions of three real properties that he was due to receive as the real estate broker when the sales transactions closed. Testimony of Arturo Gonzalez, Trial Transcript (January 11, 2018) (hereinafter "Day 1 TT") (Docket No. 95), 278:1-6. Those three real property sales transactions are identified by the property locations herein as (1) "W. L Street," (2) "Banning," and (3) "Oceanside." Debtor was aware that his sales commissions from these real estate sales transactions were pending before he filed his bankruptcy petition. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 257:25-262:4. However, Debtor only

² The citations to the page numbers of Plaintiff's Exhibits are to the Bates stamped pages in Plaintiff's Exhibit Binder presented at trial.

³ The citations to written transcripts of the trial and hearings and to documents is to page numbers and line numbers in the following format: page:line(s) or page:line to page:line.

7 8

9 10

11 12

13

14

15

17

16

18 19

20

21 22

23 24 25

26

27

28

disclosed one of these three pending sales commissions on his bankruptcy petition and schedules filed on October 5, 2015 when he listed the amount of \$9,500.00 for the W. L. Street sales commission on Schedule B-Personal Property in listing the assets of his Long Beach Realty business. Petition, Ex. P-3, p. 38.

- 4. Debtor testified at trial that the W.L. Street sales transaction went into escrow on August 1, 2015. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 260:23-25. He testified at trial that the Banning sales transaction went into escrow on August 20, 2015. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 261:18-24. He testified at trial that the Oceanside sales transaction went into escrow on September 11, 2015. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 259:1-4. Debtor also testified that the sales commission due to him for the W.L. Street sales transaction was \$10,000. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 258:11-12. He testified that the sales commission for the Banning sales transaction was \$21,178. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 258:8-10. He testified that the sales commission for the Oceanside sales transaction was \$14,625. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 258:13-23. Though escrows were open for all of these three real property sales transactions with sales commissions due Debtor totaling \$45,803, he listed only one of the real property sales commissions as an account receivable on his bankruptcy schedules with his bankruptcy petition—the W.L. Street sales commission for \$9,500. In listing the W.L. Street sales commission on his original bankruptcy schedules, Debtor did not list it as "contingent." Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 278:1-10; Petition, Ex. P-3, pp. 38 and 42.
- 5. At trial, Debtor disclosed for the first time that before he filed his bankruptcy case, he had received a sales commission for selling a fourth property, "Sandison." The sale transaction for Sandison closed on August 27, 2015, and Debtor was holding the commission check from the Sandison sales transaction in the amount of \$4,810.75 when he filed his bankruptcy petition on October 5, 2015, yet he did not disclose this asset on his bankruptcy petition or at any time subsequent until his testimony at trial. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 276:8-13; 279:8-281:7; 281:14-

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

285:22; Day 2 TT, 41:3-45:5. However, Debtor testified at trial that he disclosed this 2 asset to his bankruptcy attorney, Anerio V. Altman, and that the attorney failed to disclose it on his bankruptcy petition and schedules. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 3 281:8-12; 285:6-8. The court does not find this testimony to be credible as to the filing 4 of Debtor's petition and original bankruptcy schedules filed on October 5, 2015 and his first amended schedules filed on December 14, 2015 because Debtor offered no evidence at trial to corroborate this statement that he so informed his attorney of the Sandison commission check so that the attorney could have included it on the schedules. (As discussed below, Debtor is asserting the advice of counsel defense which he agreed to withdraw at the hearing on December 19, 2017 on Trustee's motion to compel document subpoenas to Altman, who had subsequently withdrawn as counsel for Debtor, for attorney-client communications regarding Debtor's advice of counsel defense, and based on that withdrawal of the defense, the court ordered that 13 the subpoenas not be enforced and that Debtor may not present evidence in support of 14 an advice of counsel defense, which he has subsequently tried to assert.) The Sandison commission has not been disclosed on Debtor's original and amended bankruptcy schedules. See Schedules B-Personal Property attached to Petition and Amended Schedules, Exs. P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6.

Debtor was asked at trial whether he listed his cash withdrawal of 6. \$1,253.96 from his bank account on October 5, 2015, the filing date of his bankruptcy petition, on his bankruptcy schedules, and he responded, "I don't think so." Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 78:3. Trustee argues that this testimony constitutes a false oath because this cash withdrawal was not listed on the bankruptcy petition. Trustee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed on April 30, 2018, Proposed Conclusion of Law, p. 22, ¶22. However, Debtor listed \$1,500 cash on hand on his Original Schedule B filed on October 5, 2015 and Amended Schedules filed December 14, 2015, February 4, 2016, and May 9, 2016. See Schedules B-Personal Property attached to Petition and Amended Schedules, Exs. P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6. Because

- the record is inconclusive whether the cash withdrawal was reported and included as part of the \$1,500 cash on hand on Schedule B, the court does not find that there was a false oath from an omission of the cash withdrawal of \$1,253.96 on the bankruptcy petition and schedules.
- 7. At the initial meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) on November 9, 2015, Debtor did not appear, but an appearance attorney was present to represent Defendant. Trustee told the appearance attorney to have Debtor amend the petition to list open sales commissions and continued the meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) to December 15, 2015. Declaration of Wesley H. Avery ("Avery Decl."), p. 3, ¶ 5; Testimony of Wesley H. Avery, Day 1 TT, 152:3-19.
- 8. By email dated November 9, 2015 at 10:53 p.m., Debtor told his bankruptcy attorney, Altman, that (1) the Banning sales transaction would close on November 13, 2015, and a sales commission of \$20,178 due to Debtor would be paid, and (2) a week afterwards, the Oceanside sales transaction would close, and a sales commission of \$14,625 due to Debtor would be paid. Email Exchange Between Debtor and Anerio V. Altman, dated November 9 and 10, 2015, Defendant's Trial Exhibit ("Ex. D-xx") D-19. The email shows Debtor already received the \$9,500 W.L. Street sales commission check on November 7, 2015. *Id.*
- 9. As reflected in Debtor's pleadings filed in this case, his bankruptcy attorney, Altman, was advised by the appearance attorney after the first meeting of creditors to amend the petition to include prepetition commissions received postpetition. Debtor's Reply to Opposition of Chapter 7 Trustee to Motion to Convert, Ex. P-17, p. 225. Altman acknowledged that "at the first [section] 341[(a) meeting of creditors], the Debtor did not appear, but appearance counsel did. The Trustee requested that appearance counsel inform Debtor's Counsel to amend the petition to include the pre-petition commissions received post-petition." Ex. P-17, 225:12-14. Altman declared he met with Debtor before the continued meeting of creditors in this case on December 15, 2015 to discuss "whether any commissions were funded that

4 5

6 7

9 10

8

11 12

13 14

15 16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23 24

25

26 27

28

were owed pre-petition and funded post-petition." Ex. P-17, p. 236, ¶ 14:13-14. As discussed herein, there were prepetition sales commissions owed to Debtor that he received post-petition, but he did not disclose receipt of these commissions to Trustee.

- 10. On December 14, 2015, one day before the continued meeting of creditors, Debtor filed an Amended Schedule B-Personal Property and an Amended Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt. Amended Schedules, filed on December 14, 2015, Ex. P-4, pp. 74-81. On his Amended Schedule B, Debtor identified Long Beach Realty as an asset identified along with its assets, including a bank account holding \$1,100 and business equipment valued at \$400. Instead of following Trustee's instructions to identify prepetition commissions that Debtor received post-petition, in his Amended Schedule B-Personal Property, Debtor revised Long Beach Realty's prepetition accounts receivable (sales commissions) to include them as "contingent interests at time of filing: \$44,303 (contingent)." Ex. P-4, p. 76. The W.L. Street sales commission had not been listed as "contingent" on the Schedule B filed with Debtor's original bankruptcy petition. Trustee argues that Debtor should have disclosed at the December 15, 2015 meeting of creditors that he had received payment of the prepetition sales commissions and had the funds in his possession, and that Debtor should have followed Trustee's instructions to identify the prepetition sales commissions received postpetition on the Amended Schedule B-Personal Property.
- 11. The "contingent interests" identified as accounts receivable on the Amended Schedules B and C filed on December 14, 2015 included "W. L Street Sale: \$9,500," "Banning Sale: \$20,178," and "Oceanside Sale: \$14,625" (unless otherwise noted, the commissions for the three sales transactions are collectively referred to herein as "Commissions"). On these amended schedules, Debtor then stated that Long Beach Realty had a "current value" of \$1,500. On the Amended Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt, Defendant claimed an exemption in the amount of \$1,500 in Long Beach Realty under C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(6) and gave the Commissions a value of \$0.00 under C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(5). Avery Decl., p. 3, ¶ 6; Amended Schedules, filed

on December 14, 2015; Ex. P-4, p. 80. As in his original bankruptcy schedules filed with his bankruptcy petition, Debtor did not disclose the Sandison sales commission or the cash withdrawal of \$1,253.96 on the petition date on October 5, 2015 on these amended schedules. Ex. P-4, pp 75-81; Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 194:3-14; Day 2 TT, 78:2-79:3.

- 12. At the continued meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) on December 15, 2015, Debtor testified that he signed his bankruptcy petition after having read his schedules, that he was personally familiar with the information in the petition, that to the best of his knowledge the information was true and correct, that there were no errors or omissions in his schedules to bring to Trustee's attention, and that he listed all his assets on his bankruptcy schedules. Audio Recording of Continued Meeting of Creditors on December 15, 2015, Day 1 TT, 191:12-192:25 (recording played at request of Trustee). Moreover, Debtor signed his original and amended bankruptcy schedules under penalty of perjury, affirming that the schedules were true and correct. Petition, Ex. P-3; Schedules Amended December 14, 2015, Ex. P-4; Schedules Amended February 4, 2016, Ex. P-5; Schedules Amended May 9, 2016, Ex. P-6.
- 13. Also at the continued meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) on December 15, 2015, Debtor acknowledged that he filed the amended schedules a day earlier on December 14, 2015, Audio Recording of Continued Meeting of Creditors on December 15, 2015, Day 1 TT, 193:25-194:2. Debtor was asked if there were any sales pending other than Banning, Oceanside, and W.L. Street, to which he replied there were none; Trustee advised Debtor that he could either exempt the Commissions or the equity in his home, but not both; Trustee stated he would shut down Long Beach Realty and collect the Commissions; Trustee told Debtor that he had a \$1,500 exemption in Long Beach Realty's assets, and the rest was non-exempt, and Debtor agreed; Trustee instructed Debtor not to spend any money in Long Beach Realty's bank account until he and Trustee reached an agreement, and Debtor agreed; and Debtor admitted that he knew from speaking to his appearance attorney that Trustee had a

- right to instruct him not to expend money belonging to the bankruptcy estate. Audio Recording of Continued Meeting of Creditors on December 15, 2015, Day 1 TT, 194:3-14, 198:2-17; Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 87:22-88:3; Avery Trial Decl., pp. 3-4, ¶ 7. At the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015, Debtor did not disclose his receipt of the Commissions or the Sandison commission check he was holding at the time that he filed his bankruptcy case. *Id.* The first time Debtor disclosed receiving the Sandison Commission was at trial on January 11, 2018 and only on cross-examination during trial. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 280:11-288:7-8.
- 14. Debtor admitted in his testimony at trial that the W.L. Street sales transaction closed on November 3, 2015 and that he received the \$9,500 commission check on November 7, 2015, which he cashed. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 263:9-265:10; 269:15-24. Debtor also admitted in his trial testimony that the Oceanside sales transaction closed on November 13, 2015, and he received the \$14,625 commission check on November 14 or 15, 2015. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 272:10-25. Debtor also admitted in his trial testimony that the Banning sales transaction closed on November 25, 2015, and that he received the \$20,178 commission about a week later. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 273:3-274:2.
- 15. Debtor testified at trial that he was aware when he amended his bankruptcy schedules on December 14, 2015 and when he testified at the December 15, 2015 creditors meeting that the Commissions were not then contingent, were paid, and were in his possession, and he admitted in his trial testimony that he did not tell Trustee that he had received the Commissions. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 276:14-277:24; Avery Trial Decl., p. 5, ¶ 13, Real Estate Records Pertaining to Debtor's Active and Closed Listings, Ex. P-11.
- 16. Trustee argues that Debtor filed his Amended Schedules on December 14, 2015 with the intent to mislead Trustee and to prevent Trustee from discovering Defendant had received all the Commissions. Trustee points out that Debtor gave Long Beach Realty a value of \$1,500 on the Amended Schedule B when the real value

- was \$44,303, not \$1,500, and he did not include the Sandison Commission check on the amended schedules, which item was not contingent on the date of the filing of Debtor's bankruptcy case and was not listed in the amended schedules. Trustee also points out that Debtor on his Amended Schedule C gave Long Beach Realty a value of \$1,500 and claimed an exemption in that amount pursuant to C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(6), and that Debtor gave the Commissions a value of \$0.00 under C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(5), which he also claimed as exempt. As Trustee argues, it appeared from the schedules that Defendant was only exempting the \$1,100 in Long Beach Realty's bank account and \$400 in business equipment. Amended Schedules, filed on December 14, 2015, Ex. P-4, p. 80.
- 17. In response, Debtor argues that his bankruptcy schedules were a "snapshot" of his assets on the date that he filed his bankruptcy case. Trustee argues that this does not negate the fact that Debtor knew that Trustee wanted to know the status of the Commissions as acknowledged by Debtor, his then-bankruptcy attorney, Altman, and Debtor's appearance attorney, as noted above. Debtor testified that he looked at his amended schedules before he signed them. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 39:2-13. Thus, Debtor was fully aware of the information in his amended bankruptcy schedules and that all the sales Commissions had been paid to him.
- 18. The first and only time that Debtor had disclosed receiving payment of the Sandison Sales Commission was on January 11, 2018 at trial on cross-examination. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 280:11-288:8. Instead of turning the Sandison check over to Trustee, Debtor deposited it into Long Beach Realty's bank account on December 18, 2015, three days after the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 and four days after filing the Amended Schedules on December 14, 2015. Declaration of John J. Menchaca ("Menchaca Decl."), p. 15, ¶ 2, Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements and Credits/Receipts, Ex. P-22-A.
- 19. As a defense for his nondisclosure of the Sandison Commission, Debtor testified that he did not consider it a commission anymore when he filed his bankruptcy

case on October 5, 2015 because he did not consider it pending because he had already received the commission check which was uncashed when he filed his bankruptcy case. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 151:7-152:4. However, this explanation makes Debtor's failure to disclose this commission as an asset anywhere in his bankruptcy petition and schedules more egregious than the failure to disclose the other pending sales commissions because he had received payment of the Sandison sales commission in the form of a negotiable instrument that he could reduce to cash at any time when he filed his bankruptcy petition and he failed to disclose this asset on his bankruptcy petition and schedules, which was knowing and material. Debtor's failure to disclose the Sandison sales commission check on his amended schedules filed on December 14, 2015 was another false oath because he knew he had it as a prepetition asset when he cashed it a few days later.

- 20. As another defense, Debtor testified at trial that he did not turn the Commissions over to Trustee because he wanted to convert his bankruptcy case to one under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 310:18-311:8; Day 2 TT, 29:11-30:15. As this court ruled, Debtor was not eligible for chapter 13 because he did not have any regular income. Avery Trial Decl., p. 4, ¶ 10, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Convert Case, Ex. P-20. Debtor did not file his Motion to Convert the bankruptcy case to Chapter 13 until January 15, 2016, a month after the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015, and he did so in response to Trustee's demand for disclosure of the Commissions that Debtor received at the prior meetings of creditors. See Debtor's Reply to Opposition of Chapter 7 Trustee to Motion to Convert, Ex. P-17, 237:10. Debtor testified at trial that at no time did he notify Trustee or make any effort to turn the Commission checks over to Trustee after Debtor received them. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 276:21-277:8; 277:16-24.
- 21. Debtor's argument that he wanted to pay his creditors is not supported by the evidence because he did not disclose most of his pending sales commissions and

5

8

7

10 11

12 13

14 15

16 17

18

20

21

22

19

23 24

25

27

28

26

the Sandison sales commission for which he already received a check on his bankruptcy petition and schedules when he filed his bankruptcy case on October 5, 2015, he did not tell Trustee at the meetings of creditors that he received the commissions and he was spending the commissions which were assets of the bankruptcy estate for his personal and business purposes rather than paying creditors.

- 22. Although Debtor has admitted that Long Beach Realty assets were assets of the bankruptcy estate, Debtor did not advise Trustee of the Long Beach Realty Sales Commissions nor did Debtor ask Trustee for permission before Debtor spent the Commissions that Debtor deposited into Long Beach Realty's bank account. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 65:7-16; 65:19-66:4. Plaintiff's forensic accountant, John Menchaca ("Menchaca"), testified that Long Beach Realty received sales commissions totaling \$43,664.47 between October 5, 2015 and January 28, 2016. Trial Testimony of John Menchaca, Day 1 TT, 224:1-17; Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements and Credits/Receipts, Ex. P-22-A, pp. 316-321. From Long Beach Realty's bank account, Debtor disbursed monies totaling \$33,883.52 between October 5, 2015 and January 15, 2016 to pay his personal and business expenses. Avery Decl., p. 5, ¶ 11; Menchaca Decl., p. 16, ¶ 5, Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements and Credits/Receipts, Ex. P-22-A, p. 713, ¶ 2:16-18; Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, pp. 146-168; Menchaca Testimony, Day 1 TT, 235:23-236:3; 246:12-15.
- 23. Debtor's paid accounts receivable disbursed from Long Beach Realty's bank account as of January 14, 2016 included \$21,178 from two commission checks traceable directly to the Banning sale transaction listed on his Amended Schedule B, one check for \$11,195 deposited December 3, 2015, and the other for \$8,968 deposited January 7, 2016. Menchaca Decl., p. 16, ¶¶ 5-6, Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements and Credits/Receipts, Ex. P-22-A; Menchaca Testimony, Day 1 TT, 225:3-23. At trial, Debtor admitted that he deposited the check for \$11,195 into Long Beach Realty's bank account to use the money for his

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- From December 3 to December 17, 2015, Debtor had spent \$7,173.45 of 24. 2 the \$11,195 Banning sales transaction commission deposited into Long Beach Realty's 3 checking account and had spent the balance of the Banning Sales Commissions by 4 December 24, 2015. Menchaca Decl., pp. 16-17, ¶ 7. Unbeknownst to Trustee or 5 Menchaca, Defendant deposited the Sandison commission check for \$4,810.75 on 6 December 18, 2015, only three days after being told by Trustee at the continued 7 meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 not to dissipate money in Long Beach 8 9 Realty's bank account. This brought total sales commissions directly deposited by 10 Debtor into Long Beach Realty's checking account from which Debtor disbursed therefrom not less than \$38,694.27 between October 5, 2015 and January 15, 2016, 11 12 including the \$33,883.52 identified by Menchaca and the \$4,810.75 Sandison commission check first disclosed by Debtor at trial. Expert Opinion Report of John 13 Menchaca and Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements and 14 Credits/Receipts, Exs. P-22 and 22-A, Menchaca Decl., p. 16, ¶ 5:15-18; ; Letter from 15 Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, pp. 146-168; 16 Menchaca Testimony, Day 1 TT, 235:23-236:3; 246:12-15; Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 17 TT, 68:12-19. 18
 - 25. While Debtor insisted in his trial testimony that he used Commissions for necessary business expenses, the evidence shows otherwise. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 55:13-56:3. Long Beach Realty's Bank Statements and bank account transaction register and Defendant's testimony at trial show he was using Commissions deposited into Long Beach Realty's checking account to pay his personal expenses, including Trader Joe's, Whole Foods, Sam's Club, travel costs, and all the restaurant costs identified in Long Beach Realty's bank statements and bank account transaction register. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 84:21-85:5; Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, pp. 149-168; and Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements & Credits/Receipts, Ex. P-22-A.

- 26. On December 7, 2015, Debtor used \$858.60 of the money in Long Beach Realty's bank account to purchase tickets to New York for a vacation for himself, his daughter, his brother, and his sister; he made a second airline ticket purchase on December 10, 2015 for \$795.20; and on December 14, 2015, the same day his amended schedules were filed and the day before he was scheduled to testify at the continued meeting of creditors, he spent \$1,151.88 on hotel rooms in New York for a 5-day family trip. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 70:20-73:17; Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, pp. 157-158.
- 27. There were also other personal expenses paid for by Debtor from Long Beach Realty's account that were stated on the record and contained in the bank statements in Plaintiff's Exhibits 13 and 22-A that are incorporated herein. Day 2 TT, 73:18-75:22; Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, pp. 149-168; and Schedule of Arturo Gonzalez, Bank Account Debits/Disbursements and Credits/Receipts, Ex. P-22-A. There is no evidence that Trustee consented to any of those expenditures. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 75:23-76:10; Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13.
- 28. The court finds that Debtor did not fully and accurately disclose the status of the Commissions to Trustee and led Trustee to believe all the Commissions were "contingent" when Debtor filed his Amended Schedules on December 14, 2015, and Debtor testified at the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 where Debtor did not disclose his receipt of the Commissions, and Trustee did not learn of the status of the Commissions that had been collected until after Trustee heard about the telephone conversation between his attorney, Curlee, and Debtor's attorney, Altman, on January 15, 2016.
- 29. Debtor did not disclose the Sandison Sales Commission, a prepetition asset belonging to the bankruptcy estate, to Trustee, which Debtor received and spent, as the Sandison Sales Commission was not disclosed in Defendant's bankruptcy

petition, any amendments thereto, which documents were signed by him under declaration of penalty of perjury, nor was the Sandison Sales Commission disclosed to Trustee at any time until Debtor was cross-examined at trial on January 11, 2018.

- 30. Debtor did not voluntarily turn over, surrender, or deliver estate assets as Debtor argued at trial. On January 15, 2016, Defendant's conversion motion and Plaintiff's application to employ Brett B. Curlee ("Curlee") as Trustee's counsel were filed. Curlee Decl., p. 11, ¶ 4, Application to Employ Law Offices of Brett Curlee, Ex. P-9, pp. 120-131, Main Bankruptcy Case Docket Nos. 28 and 29. At 11:50 a.m. on January 15, 2016, Curlee called Altman to discuss the status of the Commissions; Altman advised Curlee that Debtor had received "some" Commissions and was using "some" for living expenses and holding the rest to pay the mortgage for Debtor's residence after the case was converted to Chapter 13; on behalf of Trustee, Curlee instructed Altman that Debtor must sequester and account for the Commissions; and Altman stated that he would contact his client. Curlee Decl., p. 11, ¶ 4; Emails Exchanged Between Anerio V. Altman and Brett B. Curlee, Ex. P-10, pp. 132-133.
- 31. From hearing about this telephone conversation between Trustee's attorney, Curlee, and Debtor's attorney, Altman, on January 15, 2016, Trustee learned for the first time that "some" Commissions had been paid to Debtor and that Debtor was using "some" for living expenses, and Trustee reviewed Debtor's brokerage listings and found the last sale on which any Commission was due closed on November 25, 2015, 20 days before Debtor filed his amended schedules and 21 days before the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015. Avery Decl. p. 5, ¶¶ 11-13, Real Estate Records Pertaining to Debtor's Active and Closed Listings, Ex. P-11, pp. 134-140; Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 135:1-136:23. As noted above, Debtor confirmed that the three prepetition sales transactions with pending commissions due to Debtor as of the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition had closed by early December 2015.
- 32. Debtor presented no evidence at trial to demonstrate that Trustee had learned of Debtor's actions prior to January 15, 2016, and thus the court finds that the

first time that Trustee knew of Debtor's receipt and use of the Commissions was January 15, 2016.

- 33. Immediately after their telephone call on January 15, 2016, Trustee's counsel, Curlee, emailed Debtor's counsel, Altman, demanding that Debtor sequester, not spend, and account for the Commissions, and Curlee informed Altman that Trustee demanded bank statements from Debtor showing the funds were sequestered and not being used for Debtor's post-petition living expenses. Curlee Decl., pp. 11-12, ¶¶ 5 and 6; Emails Exchanged Between Anerio V. Altman and Brett B. Curlee, Ex. P-10, pp. 132-133.
- 34. At 1:55 p.m. after speaking to his client (Debtor), Altman emailed Curlee that "[a]fter taking time to speak to my client I regret to say that we will not comply with the Trustee's requests as we see no point in doing so." That is, Debtor's position was that the issues of turnover of property would be addressed in the case after it was converted to Chapter 13. Curlee Decl., p. 12, ¶ 6; Emails Exchanged Between Anerio V. Altman and Brett B. Curlee, Ex. P-10, pp. 132-133. Thus, in other words, Debtor was refusing to cooperate with Trustee and comply with Trustee's instructions that the prepetition assets of the bankruptcy estate in the Commissions not be dissipated.
- 35. Debtor's bankruptcy schedules amended on December 14, 2015, which were the operative schedules in the case as of January 15, 2016, showed that he only claimed an exemption in the amount of \$1,500 in the value of Long Beach Realty's assets reflecting the value of the cash of \$1,500.00 and equipment of \$400.00 and that he gave the Commissions a property value of \$0.00 and an exemption value of \$0.00. Thus, according to Trustee, as shown by Debtor's amended bankruptcy schedules, the balance of Long Beach Realty's assets including the "contingent" interests in the W L Street, Banning and Oceanside sales commissions which had not been claimed at that time by Debtor as exempt belonged to the bankruptcy estate. At trial, Trustee testified that it was his duty to administer and protect all nonexempt assets of the bankruptcy estate from being wasted or dissipated. Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 135:14-20.

36. According to Trustee, because he was unable to obtain Debtor's cooperation in disclosing and turning over nonexempt assets of the bankruptcy estate, on January 21, 2016, Trustee filed the complaint to commence this adversary proceeding, *Wesley H. Avery v. Arturo Gonzalez, dba Long Beach Realty, Inc.; dba South Bay Realty; dba Mindset; aka Art Gonzalez; aka Art Gonzalez, Jr.*, Adv. Case No. 2:16-ap-01637-RK ("Adversary Proceeding"). Complaint, Ex. P-1. Also, according to Trustee, he was required to move ex parte for an accounting and to bar further dissipation of the Commissions pending further hearing, and this court granted a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and set Trustee's Preliminary Injunction and Turnover Motion for hearing on February 17, 2016. Curlee Decl., p. 12, ¶ 7, Complaint and Order on Ex Parte Application for Turnover of Funds, Accounting and TRO, Exs. P-1 and P-12; Avery Decl., pp. 5-6, ¶ 14. The TRO shows that Trustee had to obtain a court order to compel Debtor to account for and report the Commissions and to halt the further use of Commissions by Debtor to pay his business and personal expenses.

37. On February 4, 2016, Debtor filed further Amended Schedules B and C to claim value in Long Beach Realty as exempt, including \$7,625 under C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(6) as a "tool of trade" and \$21,125 more under the C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(5) wild card exemption, and he listed the Commissions as no longer contingent, as Trustee had previously directed him to do at the first section 341(a) meeting of creditors. Avery Decl., p. 6, ¶ 15, Amended Schedules filed on February 4, 2016, Ex. P-5, pp. 82-90; Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 138:19-140:3. As Trustee argues, Debtor could have done that on his amended schedules filed on December 14, 2015, but he did not. Again, Debtor failed to disclose the Sandison Commission on these further amended bankruptcy schedules. These further amended bankruptcy schedules were only filed after Trustee took action to compel Debtor to disclose and turn over the Commissions. As previously noted, Debtor did not disclose the existence of the Sandison Sales Commission in this bankruptcy case until January 11, 2018 at trial. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 280:11-288:8.

- 38. Pursuant to the TRO, Debtor finally accounted for the Commissions on February 11, 2016. Avery Decl., p. 7, ¶ 18, Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, pp. 146-168; Curlee Decl., p. 13, ¶ 10, Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13. Debtor's bankruptcy counsel, Altman, confirmed to Trustee's counsel, Curlee, that as of February 11, 2016, Debtor maintained \$14,625 in uncashed checks (the Oceanside Sales Commission), and another \$10,267.50 in cash from sales commissions from the sales transaction for the Ravenna property that arose post-petition. Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, p. 146-148.
- 39. At the evidentiary hearing on Trustee's motion for preliminary injunction and turnover on February 17, 2016, this court ordered Debtor to turn over \$16,054 in non-exempt Commissions; that as Debtor's counsel, Altman was to hold another \$8,550 that Debtor argued was exempt pending Trustee's objection to Debtor's "tool of the trade" exemption; and that Debtor was allowed to keep \$20,200 as exempt based on Debtor's amended schedules claiming exemptions pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 7013.140(b)(5). Curlee Decl., pp. 13-14, ¶ 11, Transcript from Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, February 17, 2016, Ex. P-14, pp. 190-204; Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. P-15; Amended Schedules, filed on February 4, 2015, Ex. P-5, p. 85.
- 40. As a defense, Debtor argued that because he turned the non-exempt Commissions over to Trustee pursuant to the turnover order, there was no damage to the bankruptcy estate. However, as Trustee argues, Debtor did so only pursuant to a turnover order after Trustee prosecuted his turnover action against Debtor. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 1 TT, 278:11-15.
- 41. Moreover, Debtor did not disclose the \$4,810.75 Sandison Sales

 Commission at any time. Curlee Decl., pp. 13-14, ¶ 11, Letter from Anerio V. Altman to

 Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016 and Transcript from Hearing on Plaintiff's

 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, February 17, 2016, Exs. P-13 and P-14. Trustee

7

10

14 15

16

13

17 18

20 21

19

22 23

24 25

26 27

28

argues that he could have sought recovery of these monies as part of the preliminary injunction and turnover actions had Debtor accounted for these monies, but for the fact that Debtor failed to disclose or account for these additional assets.

- 42. On March 8, 2016, this court orally ruled that the remaining amount of \$8,550 that Debtor claimed as exempt was not exempt as a tool of trade and ordered Debtor to turn over these funds to Trustee. Curlee Decl., p. 14, ¶ 12, Order on Chapter 7 Trustee's Motion Objecting to Certain Personal Property Exemptions, Ex. P-18 pp. 280-283; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Objection to Personal Property Exemptions, Ex P-19, pp. 284-295.
- 43. On May 9, 2016, after the court ordered turnover of the funds of \$8,550.00, Debtor further amended his bankruptcy schedules again to show the Commissions were paid and no longer contingent. Debtor once again did not disclose the Sandison Commission of \$4,810.75 on these further amended schedules. Avery Decl., pp. 8-9, ¶ 23; Amended Schedules filed on May 9, 2016, Ex. P-6, p. 94.
- 44. The court finds that (1) Debtor only turned over to Trustee the value of the non-exempt Commissions involuntarily and only pursuant to the court's temporary restraining order to compel Debtor to report and disclose the Commissions received (and this turnover did not include the nonexempt Sandison Sales Commission); and (2) despite the turnover order, Debtor failed to cooperate with Trustee, and the bankruptcy estate was damaged, because Debtor intentionally did not report or turn over the Sandison Sales Commission of \$4,810.75. Had the Sandison Sales Commission been fully disclosed by Debtor to Trustee, Trustee could have sought turnover of an additional \$4,810.75 on behalf of the estate.
- 45. It was Debtor's duty to disclose these assets on his bankruptcy petition and schedules and otherwise to Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l) and (3) so Trustee could review the assets and determine whether these assets should be administered as part of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704. Trustee had a right to require the prepetition assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate in the

6 7

5

9 10

8

11 12

13 14

16

17

15

18

19 20

21

22 23

24 25

26

27

28

Commissions under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) not to be dissipated which Debtor ignored knowingly at his own peril. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(3) and 704.

- 46. Debtor argued at trial that there was no harm because he paid back the Commissions. That argument presumes two things: (1) Debtor's failure to cooperate is irrelevant, which it is not under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3); and (2) the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy debtor to take money belonging to the bankruptcy estate without consent of Trustee, as an option or a loan, that can be paid back later from other postpetition sources when and if available, which is contrary to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a) and 704. That argument of Debtor is not persuasive because Debtor interfered and obstructed Trustee's performance of his duties to collect and reduce to money property of the bankruptcy estate by not fully disclosing his prepetition assets and spending the undisclosed prepetition assets without the knowledge and authorization of Trustee contrary to 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and 704.
- 47. The evidence before the court shows that Debtor not only spent exempt Commissions, but also non-exempt Commissions as well. Debtor was entitled to exempt Commissions totaling \$20,200 pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 703.140(b)(5) as the parties have agreed. The bankruptcy estate was entitled to nonexempt commissions of \$16,054 pursuant to the court's turnover order, plus \$8,550 pursuant to the court's order disallowing Debtor's "tool of the trade" exemption under California Code of Civil Procedure § 703.140(b)(6), for a total of \$24,604 (which does not include the Sandison Sales Commission of \$4,810.75). Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Order on Chapter 7 Trustee's Motion Objecting to Certain Personal Property Exemptions, Exs. P-15 and P-18.
- 48. In Debtor's accounting provided to Trustee on February 11, 2016, Debtor's bankruptcy counsel, Altman, disclosed, "As stated previously, the checks for Oceanside are not cashed and can be signed over and the remainder of cash can be paid to make up the difference from the sale at Ravenna." Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, p. 148. It is not disputed that the

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

February 13, 2016, Ex. P-13, p. 147. At the further continued meeting of creditors on

February 24, 2016, Debtor testified that he had spent the \$20,178 from the Banning sales transaction and the \$9,500 from the W.L. Street sales transaction. Gonzalez

Ravenna sale was post-petition. Letter from Anerio V. Altman to Brett B. Curlee, dated

Testimony, Day 1 TT, 210:10-24. 5

- 49. Debtor testified that he turned over the two cashier's checks totaling \$14,625 from the Oceanside sales transaction to Trustee. Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 146:20-147:18; Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 81:2-11. Debtor did not have nonexempt Commissions to make up the difference between \$14,625 and the \$24,604 in total non-exempt commissions that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to receive, so Debtor made up the difference from the Ravenna sales commission of \$10,267.50 earned by Debtor postpetition, which is not property of the bankruptcy estate. Avery Decl., p. 8, ¶ 21; Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 146-147.
- 50. The court finds that Debtor spent \$9,979 of non-exempt commissions. Moreover, when the Sandison Sales Commission is taken into account, Debtor had spent \$14,789.75 of non-exempt commissions. Defendant had sufficient proceeds from the Ravenna sale to make up the difference in regard to the Commissions. This mitigating fact does not negate the adverse fact that Debtor used non-exempt Commissions to pay business and personal expenses in disregard of his duties as a bankruptcy debtor to report the acquisition of estate assets, and to deliver, turn over, and surrender those assets to Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §521(a)(3) and (4). The court further finds that Debtor has failed to voluntarily turn over to Trustee the Sandison Sales Commission, a prepetition asset which is property of the bankruptcy estate.
- 51. As a defense, Debtor testified that Trustee's duty was to object to timebarred proofs of claim and that therefore Trustee should have realized Debtor could have paid all of his creditors and should have not sought turnover of the Sales Commissions. Gonzalez Testimony, Day 2 TT, 161:22-164:7. In response, Trustee testified that the dispute over disclosure and turnover of the Sales Commissions

5

3

6

7

8 9

10 11

12 13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

occurred before the deadline for creditors to file proofs of claim on March 21, 2016 and Trustee had no way of knowing what proofs of claim would be filed before then. Avery Decl., ¶ 9, Notification of Asset Case and Request for Claims Bar Date/Notice of Possible Dividend, Ex. P-7, p. 104.

52. As Trustee testified at trial, he had to act quickly because Debtor was converting estate assets by spending the sales commission monies, so he reviewed Debtor's scheduled debts on the bankruptcy petition which listed \$97,045 in unsecured debts. Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 48:15-20; Avery Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. P-3; Petition, Ex. P-3, pp. 35 and 48-50. While a duty for Trustee to object to proofs of claim under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) might have arisen after the claims filing deadline of March 21, 2016. Trustee had to act promptly when he learned on January 15, 2016 that Debtor was spending the estate assets in the Sales Commissions. At that time, Trustee's knowledge indicated that based on Debtor's schedules, there were potentially unsecured claims of \$97,045 that may need to be paid, and Debtor was spending assets not claimed as exempt which could be used to pay such claims. Moreover, even if consideration of the claims bar date is a factor, in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, late filed claims are obligated to be paid, though such claims may be subject to subordination in order of payment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726, and this would include the proof of claim of the California Franchise Tax Board of \$5,950.17 filed late on August 19, 2016. Claim No. 5-1, filed on August 19, 2016. Therefore, the court finds that Trustee's actions were reasonable at the time that the actions were taken in order to protect the assets of the bankruptcy estate.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Causes of Action Tried by the Court. A.

1. The two remaining causes of action in the complaint were tried, including (1) the sixth cause of action to revoke Debtor's discharge obtained through fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1), and (2) the seventh cause of action to revoke Debtor's discharge for fraudulent acquisition of estate property under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2).

B. <u>Subject Matter Jurisdiction.</u>

- 2. As a preliminary matter, the court finds that Trustee's Complaint, including the claims for relief to revoke discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727, was timely filed within one year after Debtor is deemed to have received his discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(e). In this case, the court has not yet formally entered a discharge for Debtor. However, the court may and does deem that Debtor's discharge was entered as of January 9, 2016, the day after the last day of the 60-day period after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) for objecting to discharge pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a). *In re Dietz*, 914 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing, *inter alia*, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(c)).
- 3. The last date to object to Debtor's discharge was January 8, 2016, and Debtor's discharge would be effective after that day. Trustee's Adversary Complaint was filed on January 21, 2016, one week after Plaintiff discovered Defendant had received the Commissions. Complaint, Ex. P-1. While Defendant's Answer states that the discharge was never entered, formal entry of the discharge on the court's docket is not required as discharge may be deemed effective immediately on expiration of the 60-day period after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 341(a), so long as no objections are filed. Defendant's Answer to Complaint, Ex. P-2, p. 22, ¶ vv; In re Dietz, 914 F.2d at 164 (citing, inter alia, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(c)). The first meeting of creditors was set for November 9, 2015, the 60-day objection to discharge period expired on January 8, 2016, so Debtor is deemed to have received his discharge immediately after January 8, 2016, and Trustee properly sought to revoke it. Id.
- 4. No objections were raised before or at trial on any other ground to the court's jurisdiction to hear the revocation of discharge causes of action.
- 5. The court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the causes of action to revoke Defendant's discharge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(2)(A), (J) and (O) and 1334.

C. <u>Trustee's Burden of Proof as Plaintiff.</u>

6. Revocation of discharge is construed liberally for the bankruptcy debtor and strictly against the party objecting to discharge. *First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb)*, 787 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). But a court lacks discretion to refuse a request to revoke the discharge where 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) grounds are established. 4 March, Ahart, Shapiro, *California Practice Guide: Bankruptcy*, ¶ 22:1745 at 22-226 (2018) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) ("the court *shall* revoke a discharge. . . .") (emphasis added)). Trustee as Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate, by the preponderance of evidence, each element of a cause of action under §§ 727(d)(1) and (d)(2). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4005; *In re Puente*, 49 B.R. 966, 968 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).

D. <u>Elements of Plaintiff's Cause of Action Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1).</u>

- 7. Parties may object to discharge within 60 days after the meeting of creditors, and if there is no objection within that period, "the court shall forthwith grant the discharge." Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that, in deeming the discharge to have been entered on the sixtieth day, "the court acted consistently with the spirit of the bankruptcy rules, which contemplate that discharge is effective immediately upon expiration of the 60-day period following the creditors' meeting, so long as no objections are filed." *In re Dietz*, 914 F.2d at 164. Here, as reflected on the case docket for this bankruptcy case, the deadline for objecting to discharge pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) was January 8, 2016. Although the court did not formally enter an order of discharge, Debtor became entitled to a discharge on January 8, 2016, and the court may and does deem Debtor's discharge was entered as of January 9, 2016.
- 8. Considering Trustee's sixth cause of action to revoke Debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1), applicable law holds that a discharge will be revoked under § 727(d)(1) if Trustee as Plaintiff shows: (1) Debtor obtained his discharge through fraud; and (2) Trustee, as the requesting party, had no knowledge of the fraud prior to

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- fraudulently made a false oath in or in connection with the bankruptcy proceeding; and
- (2) the oath concerned a material fraud that would have resulted in the denial of
- discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) had it been known prior to discharge. *Id.*; 5
- Jones v. U.S. Trustee, Eugene, 736 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2013). 6
 - 9. "A false statement or an omission in the debtor's bankruptcy schedules or statement of financial affairs can constitute a false oath." In re Retz, 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *In re Khalil*, 379 B.R. 163, 172 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)). "An omission or misstatement that 'detrimentally affects administration of the estate' is material." In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Fogal Legware of Switzerland, Inc., v. Wills (In re Wills), 243 B.R. 58, 63 (9th Cir. BAP 1999)).
 - Debtor "knowingly and fraudulently" made false oaths in or in connection with the bankruptcy proceeding because the preponderance of the evidence shows that Debtor made false oaths on his bankruptcy petition and schedules filed on October 5, 2015, on the amended bankruptcy schedules filed on December 14, 2015, and at the continued meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) on December 15, 2015. These false oaths concerned material facts that would have resulted in denial of his discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) had they been known prior to the deadline to object to discharge. Dean v. McDow, 299 B.R. at 139.
 - 11. "Where it can be shown that there was an intentional omission of assets and disclosure of grounds which would have barred discharge, there would be justification for revoking the discharge." Donovan v. LaPorta (In re La Porta), 26 B.R. 687, 692 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1982) (citing Wendel v. Daugherty (In re Daugherty), 14 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)). The discharge may be denied under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) if the debtor "knowingly and fraudulently" made a false oath. In re Franz, 540 B.R. 765, 780 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2015) (citing In re Wills, 243 B.R. at 64). Fraudulent intent may be established by circumstantial evidence or by inferences drawn from a debtor's course of

conduct. *Id.* (citing *In re Devers*, 759 F.2d 751, 753-754 (9th Cir. 1985)); see Farmers Co-Operative Association of Talmage, Kansas v. Strunk, 671 F.2d 391, 395 (10th Cir. 1982).

E. Plaintiff's Knowledge of the Fraud Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1).

- 12. The preponderance of the evidence shows that Trustee did not have any knowledge of the false oaths in Debtor's bankruptcy petition and schedules, amendments thereto, or of the false testimony given by Defendant prior to discharge.
- 13. Trustee and his attorney, Curlee, both testified that the first time Trustee learned Debtor had collected the Commissions and was using them to pay living expenses was January 15, 2016 after Trustee heard about Curlee's telephone conversation with Debtor's counsel, Altman, that day. Avery Decl., ¶ 11; Curlee Decl., ¶ 7. Debtor did not dispute or offer any evidence at trial to refute testimony of Trustee or his attorney. Nor did Debtor dispute that January 15, 2016 was the date that Trustee first became aware that Debtor was in possession of the Commissions and was using them to pay his personal expenses.
- 14. The court finds that the testimony of Trustee and his attorney, Curlee, is credible and that Trustee, though diligent in his efforts to investigate and recover Debtor's assets, did not have actual knowledge of Debtor's actions regarding the bankruptcy estate's assets until January 15, 2016. Nor did the Trustee have actual knowledge of the falsity of Defendant's testimony at the December 15, 2015 creditors meeting, or the falsity of the original schedules or the amendments thereto, until after the deadline to object to Debtor's discharge had passed on January 8, 2016 and until January 15, 2016.

F. Application of the Law to Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) Regarding the Defendant's "Knowing and Fraudulent" Acts.

15. To revoke Debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1), the discharge must have been obtained through the fraud of the debtor. *In re Jones*, 736 F.3d at 900. To determine whether the discharge was procured by fraud, the bankruptcy court must

analyze whether the debtor would have been in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). *Id.* 1 To prove a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), Trustee must show that: (1) Debtor 2 made a false oath in connection with the case; (2) related to a material fact; 3 (3) knowingly; and (4) fraudulently. *Id.* (citing *In re Retz*, 606 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 4 2010)). "While any single omission or error may be the result of an innocent mistake, 5 multiple inaccuracies are evidence of 'a pattern of reckless and cavalier disregard for the 6 truth serious to supply the necessary fraudulent intent required by § 727(a)(4)(A)." 7 Dean v. McDow, 299 B.R. at 140 (citing Hatton v. Spencer (In re Hatton), 204 B.R. 477, 8 484 (E.D. Va. 1997)). 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- Section 521(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., requires the 16. debtor in a bankruptcy case to file a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a statement of financial affairs. 11 U.S.C. §521(a)(1)(B); see also, In re Rolland, 317 B.R. 402, 13 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004). "[T]he debtor has a duty to prepare schedules carefully, completely and accurately." Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d at 946 (citing and quoting, inter alia, In re Mohring, 142 B.R. 389, 394 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd mem., 153 B.R. 601 (9th Cir. BAP 1993), aff'd mem., 24 F.3d 247 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1). Thus, "Debtors have an absolute duty to file complete and accurate schedules." In re Rolland, 317 B.R. at 413, (citing inter alia, Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d at 946). "Full and comprehensive disclosure is critical to the integrity of the bankruptcy system." Id. (citing inter alia, Heidkamp v. Whitehead (In re Whitehead), 278 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (stating that "[t]he veracity of the debtor's Statement is absolutely essential to the successful administration of the Bankruptcy Code"); In re Bohrer, 266 B.R. 200, 201 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001) (opining that "[a] debtor may not adopt a cavalier attitude toward . . . the accuracy of his schedules by arguing that they are not precise and correct"); and In re Mohring, 142 B.R. at 389 ("The proper 'operation of the bankruptcy system depends on honest reporting.").
 - 17. Bankruptcy schedules and statements are signed under penalty of perjury.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1008; 28 U.S.C. § 1746; see also, In re Rolland, 1 2 317 B.R. at 414. "Debtors are presumed to have read the schedules and statements before signing the documents, and are responsible for their contents. In re Rolland, 317 3 B.R. at 414 (citing Carpenter v. Fanaras (In re Fanaras), 263 B.R. 655, 667 (Bankr. D. 4 Mass. 2001)). "Whether or not the documents are prepared by an attorney, debtors 5 bear an independent responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained in their 6 schedules and statements." In re Rolland, 317 B.R. at 414 (citing AT&T University Card 7 Services Corp. v. Duplante (In re Duplante), 215 B.R. 444, 447 n. 8 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). 8 9 "Schedules and statements which are inaccurate or incomplete must be corrected by the debtor, and any ambiguities contained therein are construed against the debtor." In re 10 Rolland, 317 B.R. at 414 (citing In re Mohring, 142 B.R. at 394-395). Furthermore, a 11 12 debtor has an affirmative duty to "cooperate with the trustee in preparing a 'complete inventory of the property of the debtor." *In re Mohring*, 142 B.R. at 394 (quoting Federal 13 Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015(a)). A debtor has the duty to surrender to the 14 Chapter 7 trustee all property of the bankruptcy estate and any recorded information, 15 including books, documents, records and papers relating to property of the estate. 11 16 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4); see also, Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen), 36 F.3d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 17 1994). 18

18. "A fact is material 'if it bears a relationship to the debtor's business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of the debtor's property." *In re Khalil*, 379 B.R. at 173 (quoting *In re Wills*, 243 B.R. at 62). "An omission or misstatement that 'detrimentally affects administration of the estate' is material." *In re Retz*, 606 F.3d at 1198 (quoting *In re Wills*, 243 B.R. at 63). "Even if the debtor can show that the assets were of little value or that a full and truthful answer would not have directly increased the estate assets, a discharge may be denied if the omission adversely affects the trustee's or creditors' ability to discover other assets or to fully investigate the debtor's pre-bankruptcy dealing and financial condition." *In re Wills*, 243 B.R. at 63 (citing 6 Collier on Bankruptcy

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

6

7 8

10 11

9

12 13

14

15

16 17

18 19

21 22

20

23

24 25

26

27

28

¶ 727.04[1][b] (15th ed. 1998)). "Similarly, if the omission interferes with the possibility of a preference or fraudulent conveyance action the omission may be considered material." Id.

- 19. The preponderance of the evidence shows that Debtor made false oaths regarding his original and amended bankruptcy schedules which he signed under penalty of perjury as true and correct. Petition, Ex. P-3, pp. 28, 38, 42. In his original bankruptcy petition and schedules, Debtor omitted the Sandison Sales Commission check when he filed his bankruptcy petition and schedules on October 5, 2015. On his Schedule B-Personal Property filed with his bankruptcy petition, Debtor listed Long Beach Realty and identified its assets as including \$9,500 in accounts receivable, and on Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt, he claimed an exemption of \$10,600 in the value of Long Beach Realty's assets pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 703.140(b)(5), including \$9,500 for an account receivable, but he did not list the account receivable as "contingent."
- 20. Although Debtor argued that he disclosed everything he needed to on his bankruptcy petition and schedules when he filed his bankruptcy case, that statement is not true. There were three real property sales transactions pending as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy case for which Debtor was to receive sales commissions, including for the W.L. Street, Banning and Oceanside sales transactions, but only the commission for one of these transactions (for W L Street) was disclosed on the bankruptcy petition and schedules and the other commissions for the two transactions (for Banning and Oceanside) were not. Yet Debtor was aware that all these real property sales transactions were in escrow when he filed his bankruptcy case. There were three accounts receivable, not one as stated by Debtor on his bankruptcy petition and schedules when he filed them on October 5, 2015, and these accounts receivable totaled \$45,803, not \$9,500 as Debtor stated on his bankruptcy petition and schedules, which is a material difference of over \$31,000.
 - 21. Debtor did not identify the Banning and Oceanside Sales Commissions as

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22. Debtor was fully aware that Trustee wanted to know what Debtor's prepetition sales commissions were and what was paid post-petition. At the initial meeting of creditors on November 9, 2015, Trustee told Debtor's appearance attorney to have Debtor amend the petition to list open sales commissions and continued the meeting of creditors to December 15, 2015. Debtor's bankruptcy attorney, Altman, was advised by the appearance attorney for Debtor to amend the petition to include prepetition commissions paid post-petition. Altman met with Debtor to discuss the Commissions before the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015. Debtor was aware on November 9, 2015 of the status and amounts of the Commissions as the email he sent to Altman that day provides a full accounting of the Commissions. Email Exchange between Debtor and His Attorney, Anerio V. Altman on November 9, 2015, Ex. D-19.

23.

December 2015, but instead of disclosing that he received the Commissions on his amended schedules filed on December 14, 2015, he listed the Commissions with a value of \$0.00 on the date that he filed his bankruptcy case, knowing full well that the Commissions of \$44,303 had been actually collected.

As Debtor testified at trial, he had received the Commissions by early

- 24. Debtor filed Amended Schedules B and C on December 14, 2015 to show that Long Beach Realty's prepetition accounts receivable (brokerage commissions) included "contingent interests at time of filing: \$44,303 (contingent)." Debtor identified the "contingent interests" as accounts receivable including \$9,500 for "W.L. Street Sale," \$20,178 for the "Banning Sale," and \$14,625 for the "Oceanside Sale." But, he then valued Long Beach Realty at \$1,500 for \$1,100 in Long Beach Realty's bank account and \$400 in business equipment. On this Amended Schedule C, Debtor claimed an exemption of \$1,500 in Long Beach Realty under C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(6) and an exemption in the Commissions which were valued at \$0.00 under C.C.P. § 703.140(b)(5).
- 25. Debtor's original Schedules B and C filed with his bankruptcy petition on October 5, 2015 showed that \$9,500 was owed on the W.L. Street account receivable and \$9,500 in value was exempted. The November 9, 2015 email from Debtor to his then-bankruptcy attorney, Altman, shows that Debtor received the W.L. Street Sales Commission on November 7, 2015 before the first meeting of creditors took place on November 9, 2015. Debtor's Amended Schedules B and C filed on December 14, 2015 disclosed the Commissions, but listed them as "contingent" and valued them, including the W.L. Street sales commission, at \$0.00 on the Amended Schedule C. The Commissions never had a value of \$0.00 even on the date that Debtor filed his bankruptcy case on October 5, 2015. Debtor did not disclose the Sandison Sales Commission check of \$4,810.75 on these amended bankruptcy schedules. Trustee argues that Debtor's misrepresentations about his real estate sales commissions on his amended bankruptcy schedules were material because he did not disclose that he

received \$44,303 in Commissions and \$4,810.75 for the Sandison Commission for a 1 2 total of \$49,113.75 which were non-exempt assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate as he valued these assets at \$0.00. On this point, the court agrees in part and disagrees in 3 part with Trustee's argument. The court agrees with Trustee that Debtor's continued 4 5 failure to list the Sandison Commission of \$4,810.75, an asset of the bankruptcy estate which Debtor earned prepetition, on his amended schedules signed under penalty of 6 perjury filed on December 14, 2015, was a false oath which was material. This second 7 omission under oath on the amended schedules filed on December 2015 after the first 8 9 omission on the original schedules filed on October 5, 2015 is egregious because 10 Debtor had the Sandison Commission check of \$4,810.75 in his possession when he made an oath on both sets of schedules that they were true and correct, omitting this 11 item. However, the court disagrees that Debtor's listing of the W L Street, Oceanside 12 and Banning sales commissions as "contingent" with a value of zero on the amended 13 schedules filed on December 14, 2015 were additional false oaths because Debtor listed 14 these commissions on the amended schedules with the correct amounts of \$9,500 for W 15 L Street, \$20,178 for Banning and \$14,625 for Oceanside which put Trustee on notice of 16 these assets. It is arguable that Debtor's listing of these commissions as "contingent" 17 18 with a value of zero was misleading, but it may have not been misleading to state the commissions on the schedules as "contingent" because the schedules are intended to 19 20 reflect the debtor's assets and liabilities as of the date that the bankruptcy petition was filed (as the schedules request Debtor to state the "current value" of assets and 21 liabilities, thus, the schedules and any amendments should reflect the "current value" as 22 23 of the date of filing of the petition to which the schedules relate), and not later, and as 24 Debtor argues, he does not receive payment of the commissions until escrow for the 25 sales transactions closed postpetition. Trustee makes a good point that Debtor's listing of his sales commissions as "contingent" on his amended schedules is inconsistent with 26 Debtor's listing of the amount of the W L Street commission of \$9,500 as an accounts 27

27

28

Debtor on his later schedules filed on February 4, 2016 stating that the commissions were "contingent at time of filing, no longer contingent". Nevertheless, the court does not find that Debtor's listing of the W L Street, Banning and Oceanside sales commissions as "contingent" on the amended schedules filed on December 14, 2015 as additional false oaths since the material information about these commissions were materially disclosed, and Trustee could have inquired of Debtor about the status of collection of the commissions. Moreover, as to Debtor's valuing the sales commissions at \$0.00 on the amended schedules filed on December 14, 2015, it may have been misleading to have done so because this was inconsistent with the original schedules which listed the value of the W L Street commission at full value of \$9,500 in valuing the Long Beach Realty assets at \$11,000 and Debtor does not state any reasonable basis for valuing the sales commission receivables as zero, but the court does not find that Debtor's listing the W L Street, Banning and Oceanside sales commissions with zero value on the amended schedules filed on December 15, 2015 as additional false oaths because the material information about these commissions were disclosed on the amended schedules, that is, the identity of the properties to which the commissions related and the amount of the anticipated commissions were stated. However, valuing the commissions at zero on the amended schedules is probative of a fraudulent intent for Debtor's failure to list his sales commission assets completely and accurately on his bankruptcy petition and schedules filed on October 5, 2015 and December 14, 2015.

26. At the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015, Debtor testified under oath that he signed his bankruptcy petition after reading the schedules and was personally familiar with the information therein; that the information was true and correct; that there were no errors or omissions he needed to bring to Trustee's attention; and that he listed all his assets in his schedules. Audio Recording of Continued Meeting of Creditors on December 15, 2015, Day 1 TT, 190:4-203:16. Debtor acknowledged filing his first amended schedules a day earlier on December 14, 2015. However, Debtor did not disclose in his testimony at the continued meeting of

8

9

6

12

13

14 15

17

16

19

18

2021

2223

24 25

2627

28

creditors on December 15, 2015 that he received any Commissions, nor did he disclose that he was in possession of the Sandison sales commission check on these amended schedules or at the meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015. Defendant testified at trial that he was aware when he amended his schedules on December 14, 2015 and when he testified at the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 that the Commissions were no longer contingent, had been paid, and were in his possession.

- 27. Debtor's failures to fully disclose all of his prepetition sales commission assets on his bankruptcy petition and schedules and at the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 were knowing and fraudulent. Specifically, Debtor failed to disclose the Banning, Oceanside and Sandison sales commissions on his original bankruptcy schedules and he failed to disclose the Sandison sales commission on his amended schedules. The circumstances in this case indicate that Debtor failed to make these disclosures in order to mislead Trustee because Debtor wanted to use them after the bankruptcy case was filed to pay his (Debtor's) personal and business expenses. Debtor deposited the Commission checks into Long Beach Realty's bank account or cashed them and spent them without notifying Trustee or amending his bankruptcy schedules to state that he received them. Debtor through Long Beach Realty received Commissions of \$43,664.47 between October 5, 2015 and January 28, 2016, not including the Sandison Sales Commission. Debtor disbursed \$33,883.52 of these funds from Long Beach Realty's bank account between October 5, 2015 and January 15, 2016 to pay his expenses.
- 28. Debtor deposited both Sales Commission checks for the Banning sales transaction—one check on December 3, 2015 for \$11,195 and the other check for on January 7, 2016 \$8,968. Debtor disbursed the monies from the Banning Sales Commission totaling \$21,178, by January 14, 2016. At trial, Debtor admitted in his testimony that he deposited the check for \$11,195 into Long Beach Realty's bank account to cash it and to use the money for his business and personal expenses. By December 24, 2015, Debtor spent all the money from the \$11,195 check from the

Banning Sale Commission.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 29. As his defense regarding the Sandison Sales Commission, Debtor testified at trial that he did not consider the Sandison Sales Commission to be a pending commission when he filed his bankruptcy case because he had the uncashed check. The court finds this testimony to not be credible. Defendant's testimony does not explain his failure to disclose the Sandison Sales Commission subsequent to the filing of Debtor's bankruptcy petition, in any of his amended bankruptcy schedules, or until trial on cross-examination on January 11, 2018. There is no reasonable justification for Debtor not listing the Sandison sales commission check as an asset on his bankruptcy petition and schedules because there were no contingencies as he had in possession a check which he was free to reduce to cash by depositing it into his bank account at any time, which he did in December 2015 shortly after filing amended schedules which did not disclose that asset. Without advising Trustee or obtaining his permission, Debtor deposited the Sandison Sales Commission check for \$4,810.75 into Long Beach Realty's bank account on December 18, 2015, only three days after stating to Trustee at the meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 that he had disclosed all his assets on his bankruptcy petition and schedules. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Debtor made a false oath on his bankruptcy petition and schedules when he failed to list the Sandison Sales Commission check of \$4,810.75 as an asset, which was a knowing and material omission.
- 30. As a further defense, Debtor argued at trial that he filed a motion to convert this case to one under Chapter 13 and that he was thus not required to disclose or to turn over the Commissions to Trustee because he was converting the case to Chapter 13 and wanted to pay his creditors. The court finds that this argument lacks merit. A motion to convert a case to another chapter is not effective until an order is entered granting conversion. 11 U.S.C. § 706(a); Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(2) and 9013; *In re Dipalma*, 94 B.R. 546, 549 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988) (citing Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(d) (now 1017(f)(2)) and 9013). This court

- determined that Debtor was ineligible for Chapter 13. Ex. P-20. *Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts*, 549 U.S. 365, 371-374 (2007). The mere filing of a case conversion motion is not a defense because it does not relieve Trustee of his statutory authority and duties regarding administration of assets of the bankruptcy estate in this case under 11 U.S.C. § 704, nor does it relieve Debtor of his duty to disclose or turn over estate property to Trustee under 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1), (3) and (4).
- 31. The evidence that Trustee presented at trial shows that Debtor was not cooperating with Trustee as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) and (4) and that Debtor was using the false schedules and testimony at the meeting of creditors to avoid disclosure of his dissipation and misuse of the estate assets in the Sales Commissions. As Trustee argues, Debtor filed the case conversion motion on January 15, 2016, not to pay his creditors in a Chapter 13 case, but to avoid having to turn over these assets to Trustee and to hide the fraudulent use of the estate assets in the Sales Commissions from Trustee so he could continue using them for his expenses.
- 32. The week before Debtor filed his amended schedules, he used the Commissions deposited into Long Beach Realty's bank account to pay for a family vacation to New York. Debtor purchased \$1,653.80 worth of airline tickets for his family on December 10 and 13, 2015. On December 14, 2015, the day that Debtor filed his amended schedules valuing the Commissions at \$0.00 and identifying them as "contingent," he spent \$1,151.88 from Long Beach Realty's bank account on hotel rooms in New York. Debtor admitted that other expenses paid from Long Beach Realty's checking account for Sam's Club, Trader Joe's, Whole Foods, and all restaurant charges were personal expenses. Debtor's use of the Commissions which were estate assets under these circumstances is evidence of a fraudulent intent for Debtor's failure to list all of his sales commissions as estate assets on his bankruptcy petition and schedules he signed under oath and filed on October 5, 2015 and December 14, 2015.
- 33. Debtor only admitted to these expenditures on examination by Trustee's counsel at trial. When Trustee first learned of Debtor's unauthorized use of the

Commissions, which are his prepetition assets belong to the bankruptcy estate, on January 15, 2016, Debtor refused to account for the Commissions or to sequester them as required by 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and (4).

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 34. Trustee has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Debtor knowingly and fraudulently made false oaths as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) in connection with his bankruptcy case, including making false and fraudulent oaths regarding his bankruptcy schedules and the amendments thereto, not accurately disclosing all of his Commissions on his schedules, and not disclosing the Sandison Sales Commission specifically. Debtor also gave false testimony at the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 that he had fully and accurately disclosed all his assets on his petition and schedules, and the Sandison sales commission check is a specific example of Debtor's material failures to disclose his assets on his bankruptcy petition and schedules signed under oath.
- 35. Trustee has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the false oaths that Debtor made on his bankruptcy schedules and the amendments thereto were material. At the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015, Debtor did not disclose to Trustee that he had received \$44,303 in Commissions and \$4,810.75 for the undisclosed Sandison Sales Commission for a total of \$49,113.75. These omissions were material because they detrimentally affected Trustee's administration of the estate because Debtor was spending the Commissions before Trustee could administer them as assets of the bankruptcy estate.
- 36. The court finds that Trustee has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Debtor's fraud regarding estate assets, if known prior to the deadline to object to discharge, would have resulted in his discharge being denied under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). *In re Franz,* 540 B.R. at 780 (citing *In re Wills,* 243 B.R. at 64).

G. Elements of Plaintiff's Cause of Action Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2).

37. Considering the seventh cause of action under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2), Debtor's discharge may be revoked if he: (1) acquired bankruptcy estate property; and

9 10

8

11 12

14

15

13

16 17

18

19 20

21 22

23 24

25

26 27

- (2) knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition or to deliver or surrender such property to Trustee. In re Franz, 540 B.R. at 780 (citing In re Yonikus, 974 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1992)); In re Covino, 241 B.R. 673, 677 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (citing Bowman v. Belt Valley Bank (In re Bowman), 173 B.R. 922, 925-926 (9th Cir. BAP 1994)).
- 38. Regarding the first element of a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2), a bankruptcy debtor has an absolute duty to report whatever interest he has in property, including a prepetition interest, even if he believes it to be valueless. In re Covino, 241 B.R. at 677 (citing *In re Yonikus*, 974 F.2d at 904 and n.7). It is a bankruptcy debtor's duty to share full information with the bankruptcy trustee. Id.: 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and (a)(4); Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4002(a)(4); In re Franz, 540 B.R. at 780 (citing In re Retz, 606 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 2010)); see generally Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-287 (1991) (bankruptcy "limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor'") (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). Debtor's right to a fresh start in bankruptcy is conditioned upon full disclosure. *In re Franz*, 540 B.R. at 780 (citing *Aubrey v. Thomas* (In re Aubrey), 111 B.R. 268, 274 (9th Cir. BAP 1990)).
- 39. On the second element of a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2), whether a bankruptcy debtor "knowingly and fraudulently" fails to report or deliver property, intent is inferred from his course of conduct or the surrounding circumstances. In re Yonikus, 974 F.2d at 905, (citing *In re Devers*, 759 F.2d at 753-754). "Because a debtor is unlikely to testify directly that his intent was fraudulent, the courts may deduce fraudulent intent from all the facts and circumstances of a case." In re Devers, 759 F.2d at 754 (citing *In re Nazarian*, 18 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982)).
- 40. As to whether Debtor acted fraudulently, Trustee must show that Debtor knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath regarding a material fact as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). Wallick v. Thunberg (In re Thunberg), 413 B.R. 20, 25 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2009). Each element must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. *Id.*

8

9

10 11 12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21 22

24 25

23

26 27

- at 26. Once it reasonably appears the oath is false, the burden shifts to the debtor to come forward with evidence to show that the oath was not fraudulent. *Id.* at 25 (citing Matter of Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 1974)).
- Н. Application of the Law to Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) Regarding Defendant's "Knowing and Fraudulent" Acts in Acquiring Assets of the Estate and Failing to Report and Deliver Those Assets to the Trustee.
- 41. The court finds that Debtor acquired property of the bankruptcy estate, which includes the Commissions and the Sandison Sales Commission. When Trustee discovered on January 15, 2016, that Debtor had received the Commissions and was spending them, Debtor neither voluntarily accounted for them, reported them, nor delivered the Commissions to Trustee as the Chapter 7 Trustee.
- 42. In his January 15, 2016 email to Debtor's counsel, Trustee's counsel on behalf of Trustee instructed Debtor to account for and sequester the Commissions, but he refused and continued to refuse until the court entered its TRO requiring Debtor to account for the Commissions and entered its order requiring Debtor to turn over the Commissions.
- 43. The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that Debtor acted knowingly and fraudulently. At the continued meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015, Trustee told Debtor that Debtor would shut down Long Beach Realty and collect the Commissions. Trustee told Debtor that Debtor had a \$1,500 exemption in Long Beach Realty's assets and the rest of its assets were non-exempt, and Debtor agreed. Trustee instructed Debtor not to spend any money in Long Beach Realty's bank account until they reached an agreement, and Debtor agreed. Trustee advised Debtor that Debtor could exempt his home or the corporation but would have to give up one and could not keep both. Trustee told Debtor not to dissipate the money until an agreement was worked out.
 - 44. Debtor admitted at trial that he knew when he amended his bankruptcy

- 45. Debtor's silence under these circumstances demonstrates his fraudulent intent. The deliberate nondisclosure of a material fact is no less culpable than an intentional false statement. *Piccolomini v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., (In re Piccolomini)*, 87 B.R. 385, 387 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (citing *inter alia, Mursau Corp. v. Florida Penn Oil & Gas Inc.*, 638 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Pa. 1986) and *Marian Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp*, 550 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Pa. 1982), *aff'd mem.*, 725 F.2d 668 (3rd Cir. 1983)). Debtor was and is duty bound to disclose the receipt and possession of the Commissions and the Sandison Commission to Trustee, but he intentionally refused to do so. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1), (3) and (4). Moreover, these omissions were material because they detrimentally affected Trustee's administration of the estate.
- 46. Debtor's amended bankruptcy schedules filed on December 15, 2015, which were the operative schedules as of January 15, 2016, show that Debtor only claimed an exemption of \$1,500 in Long Beach Realty's assets. Based on the representations in Debtor's amended bankruptcy schedules, the balance of Long Beach Realty's assets, including most of the sales commissions listed as "contingent", belonged to the bankruptcy estate. At the time of trial, on cross-examination, Debtor admitted that he knew from speaking with his appearance attorney that Trustee had a right to instruct him not to expend money belonging to the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and (4) and 704.
- 47. At trial, Trustee testified that it was his duty to administer and protect all nonexempt assets of the bankruptcy estate from being wasted or dissipated. See 11

- U.S.C. § 704. As the Chapter 7 Trustee, Trustee is statutorily obligated to investigate charges of concealment of assets, fraud, or any other wrongdoing by the debtor. *In re Chicago Art Glass, Inc.*, 155 B.R. 180, 188 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1993) (citing *In re Melenyzer*, 140 B.R. 143, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992)). Trustee is a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate's creditors charged with securing and carefully preserving assets in his possession on pain of surcharge for any assets that are or might be dissipated. *Id.* at 187; *see also* 11 U.S.C. § 704. Trustee "may be charged with the value of assets which never came into his possession, if he fails in his duty to get them into his possession." *In re Melenyzer*, 140 B.R. at 155 (quoting *Pueblo Savings & Trust Co. v. Power*, 115 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1940)). Trustee, as the Chapter 7 Trustee, was duty bound to act. 11 U.S.C. § 704.
- 48. As of January 15, 2016, Trustee learned Debtor was in possession of estate assets, was dissipating them, and was refusing to account for them in direct disregard of Trustee's duty to collect and preserve assets. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (a)(1)-(4).
- 49. Although Debtor argued at trial that he filed his motion to convert the case to Chapter 13, that fact does not relieve Trustee of his duties as the Chapter 7 Trustee to administer assets until the case is converted. As discussed above, Debtor was not eligible for conversion of the case to Chapter 13. Nor does this fact absolve Debtor of his duty to report and deliver assets of the bankruptcy estate to Trustee. This court has found no case authority to demonstrate that a Trustee loses authority to administer assets of a bankruptcy estate when a motion to convert the bankruptcy case is filed, only when granted pursuant to an order. The court denied Debtor's motion to convert the case by entered order. The court finds that Trustee acted appropriately and diligently as required by the Bankruptcy Code to recover the Commissions as property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704.
- 50. Trustee was forced to file the complaint to initiate this Adversary

 Proceeding on January 21, 2016 and to move ex parte to obtain the temporary

 restraining order to compel Debtor to account for the Commissions and to halt him from

5

7

8

6

9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23 24

25

26 27

28

further use of Commissions to pay his expenses. Complaint, Ex. P-1; Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. P-15. 51. On February 4, 2016, Debtor filed Amended Schedules B and C to

- describe the Commissions as "contingent at the time of filing, no longer contingent." Amended Schedules filed on February 4, 2016, Ex. P-5, p. 85. This amendment could have been made on December 14, 2015 or disclosed at the continued meeting of creditors on the next day on December 15, 2015. Debtor offered no explanation why he could not have made the disclosures that he made in his amended schedules filed on February 4, 2016 earlier. Debtor's eventual disclosure does not absolve him of his earlier conduct and omissions. See In re Thunberg, 641 F.3d 559, 560 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Olsen v. Reese (In re Reese), 203 B.R. 425, 431-432 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1997)); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1), (3) and (4). As argued by Trustee, it was only in the face of the court's order that Debtor disclosed and accounted for the Commissions in the amended schedules on February 4, 2016 and in the letter from Debtor's counsel, Altman, to Trustee's counsel, Curlee, dated February 11, 2016. Amended Schedules filed on February 4, 2016, Ex. P-5; Correspondence dated February 11, 2016 re: Accounting for Receipt and Expenditure of Commissions, Ex. P-13, pp. 146-168.
- 52. Debtor's duty is to cooperate with Trustee and to surrender all estate property and any recorded information relating to property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and (a)(4); Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4002(a)(4); see also, e.g., Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen), 36 F.3d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1994). Trustee was entitled to rely on Debtor to cooperate. *Id.* Instead, Debtor deliberately refused to voluntarily disclose to Trustee his acquisition of the estate property, namely, the Sales Commissions, including the Sandison Sales Commission.
- 53. At the trial on Trustee's preliminary injunction and turnover motion on February 17, 2016, the court ordered Debtor to turn over \$16,054 in non-exempt Commissions. Debtor's bankruptcy counsel, Altman, held another \$8,550 which Defendant argued was exempt pending Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's "tool of the

12

13

14

11

15 16

18

19

17

20

21

22

23 24 25

26

27

28

at trial in these proceedings showed that he only delivered the non-exempt Commissions after the turnover order was entered.

54. Debtor did not disclose the Sandison Sales Commission in his bankruptcy petition and schedules filed on October 5, 2015. Trustee could have sought recovery of these monies as part of the preliminary injunction and turnover actions had Debtor accounted for these monies, but for the fact that Debtor failed to account or disclose these assets until trial. To this day, Debtor has not delivered the Sandison Sales Commission to Trustee.

trade" exemption. Debtor was allowed to keep \$20,200 as exempt. Debtor's testimony

- 55. The court finds that, excluding the Sandison Sales Commission check, Debtor did account for the Commissions and that their value was turned over, but involuntarily and only pursuant to the TRO and the subsequent turnover order to compel compliance with Debtor's duties.
- 56. The court finds that the bankruptcy estate was damaged because Debtor acquired the Sandison Sales Commission of \$4,810.75, and the bankruptcy estate was and is entitled to recover as non-exempt assets of the estate, but Debtor has not delivered this asset to Trustee.
- 57. The court finds that Debtor knowingly and fraudulently acquired estate assets, including the Commissions and the Sandison Sales Commission. The court further finds that Defendant knowingly and fraudulently failed to report or deliver the estate property to Trustee.

I. Debtor's Argument that Trustee Did Not Object to Time-Barred Claims.

58. At trial, Debtor argued that Trustee had a duty to object to time-barred proofs of claim, which Debtor contends that Trustee did not do. Debtor argued that had Trustee objected to time-barred claims, he would have realized Debtor could have paid his creditors. Debtor therefore argues that Trustee acted negligently by seeking to recover the Commissions for the estate. Gonzalez Decl., 2:20-4:4, 6:21-26; see also Debtor's Response to Trustee's Notice of Lodgment of Order in Adversary Proceeding to

23

24

25

26

27

28

Revoke the Debtor's Discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) and (2) and for Fraudulent Acquisition of Assets, Docket No. 114, filed on June 14, 2018 (citing, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5)). Debtor argues that Trustee should have immediately objected to the proofs of claims of Discover Bank and Western Federal Credit Union, filed on December 29, 2015 and January 4, 2016 since the statute of limitations on those contract claims under state law expired before the petition date and such claims should be disallowed. Debtor's Response to Trustee's Notice of Lodgment of Order in Adversary Proceeding to Revoke the Debtor's Discharge under 11 U.S.C. 727(d)(1) and (2) and for Fraudulent Acquisition of Assets, Docket No. 114, filed on June 14, 2018, at 1-8. (The proofs of claim of Discover Bank and Western Federal Credit Union were later withdrawn. See Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 48:25 to 54:6.) Thus, according to Debtor, Trustee should have objected to these claims under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) as of January 21, 2016 when Trustee filed this adversary proceeding because if Trustee had, the only valid creditor claim in this case would have been only the claim of the Internal Revenue Service of \$33,692.74, of which \$32,926.98 was secured by Debtor's real property. *Id.* According to Debtor, he had no fraudulent intent to defraud creditors because there are no valid creditor claims, except the IRS claim which was secured by his real property. Id. Moreover, as Debtor argues, there was no need for him to comply with Trustee's instructions to Debtor at the meeting of creditors on December 15, 2015 not to spend money, i.e., the sales commissions, because the bankruptcy estate was solvent according to Debtor's calculations based on disallowance of the statute-barred contract claims of Discover Bank and Western Federal Credit Union. Id. at 3-4.

59. Under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5), Trustee has a duty to, "if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claim and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper." See also Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S.Ct. 1407, 1413 (2017) (noting that "[t]he audience in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases includes a trustee, 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a), who must examine proofs of claim and, where appropriate, pose an objection, §§ 704(a)(5), 1302(b)(1) (including any timeliness objection, §§ 502(b)(1),

23

24

25

26

27

28

558)."). At the time that Trustee initiated this adversary proceeding on January 21, 2016, Trustee should have been aware that Discover Bank and Western Federal Credit Union had filed their proofs of claim on December 29, 2015 and January 4, 2016, but Trustee was aware that Debtor had scheduled debts of unsecured creditors totaling \$97,045 as shown on the petition and schedules, which meant that there could be potential unsecured claims in that amount filed in the case. Avery Testimony, Day 1 TT, 48:15-20; Avery Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. P-3; Petition, Ex. P-3, pp. 35 and 48-50. Creditors of the bankruptcy estate had until the deadline of March 21, 2016 to file proofs of claim, and as of January 21, 2016, Trustee had no way of knowing what claims would be filed against the Estate until the deadline for filing proofs of claim had passed. Debtor has presented no evidence to demonstrate that Trustee knew what claims would be filed before the claims bar date. Moreover, even if the claims bar date, late filed claims are entitled to a distribution from the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726, although such late filed claims may be subordinated in payment to timely claims. This would include the California Franchise Tax Board claim of \$5,950.15, which was filed late. Late filed claims may be still be entitled to a distribution from the estate since Trustee has not mailed a summary of his final report to creditors or commenced making final distributions. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). Moreover, Debtor's argument does not take into account the administrative expenses of Trustee and his professionals in administering this case which have to be considered in any distribution in this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726.

60. Here, Trustee acted reasonably in seeking to recover the estate assets in this adversary proceeding because Debtor was already spending estate assets in the Commissions and thus dissipating estate assets which would have been otherwise used to pay creditors based on the potential claims of unsecured creditors of \$97,045 as known to Trustee as of the filing date of the adversary proceeding on January 21, 2016 and the administrative expense claims of Trustee and his professionals incurred in the administration of this case. Debtor's argument that it was not necessary for Trustee to have acted if he had objected to the statute-barred claims of Discover Bank and

Western Federal Credit Union since the estate is solvent is based on a perspective based on hindsight which was not available to Trustee on January 21, 2016 when he filed this adversary proceeding to stop Debtor from dissipating estate assets in light of potential claims of \$97,045 as listed by Debtor on his bankruptcy petition and schedules, which were the facts known to Trustee at the time on January 21, 2016. Debtor's argument that the estate is solvent may not be right due to Trustee having to incur administrative expenses in having to retain counsel and bring suit to stop Debtor from dissipating estate assets in violation of Debtor's duties to cooperate with Trustee and surrender estate assets to Trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) and (4) and to the fact that creditors may still file late claims which are entitled to be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726. Accordingly, Debtor's defense that Trustee negligently failed to object to statute-barred claims before Trustee filed this adversary proceeding lacks merit.

J. Debtor's Advice of Counsel Defense.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

61. Debtor argued that his failure to disclose the Commissions was due to bad advice from his attorney. This court has already ruled that Debtor waived such a defense, and the court ordered that Debtor could not present evidence of this defense at trial, because Debtor would not waive the attorney-client privilege to allow Trustee to discover the communications between Debtor and his bankruptcy counsel, Altman, which allegedly set forth the attorney's advice to Debtor. In the court's Order on Trustee's motion to compel compliance with a subpoena for production of documents, the court ordered as follows: "(1) The 'advice of counsel defense' was hereby waived for the trial in regard[] to the Plaintiff's complaint and the remaining causes of action pertaining to revocation of the Defendant's discharge; [and] (2) The Defendant may not present any evidence at trial regarding an 'advice of counsel' defense." Order, Docket No. 81 at 2; see also Stipulation to Disputed Issues Regarding Objections by Subpoenaed Parties to Document Production Subpoenas Service 10/23/2017 on Anerio V. Altman and Lake Forest Bankruptcy, Inc., by the Plaintiff, Wesley H. Avery, for Document Production Pertaining to Defendant's Advice of Counsel Defense, Docket No.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- Advice of counsel can be a defense to the revocation of discharge causes of action when such reliance negates the element of intent. See In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1343. However, a party intending to rely on advice of counsel at trial must make full disclosure during discovery, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the advice of counsel defense. In re Residential Capital, LLC, 491 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). Asserting the attorney-client privilege in discovery automatically constitutes a waiver of the advice of counsel defense. Id. at 69 (citing Cary Oil Co., Inc. v. MG Refining & Marketing, Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 751, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
- 63. The court finds that Debtor waived the advice of counsel defense to Trustee's revocation of Debtor's causes of action pursuant to the Order of the court entered December 20, 2017 (Docket No. 81). Trustee served subpoenas on Debtor's bankruptcy attorney, Altman, on October 23, 2017 seeking discovery regarding Altman's communications with Debtor regarding Debtor's advice of counsel defense. As indicated by the discovery dispute stipulation between Trustee and Altman, Altman objected to the document production based on the assertion of the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges based on Debtor's instructions and was maintaining that objection unless Debtor waived the privileges to allow Altman to produce documents, and Trustee therefore filed a motion (Docket Nos. 73 and 74) to compel Altman to produce documents regarding Debtor's advice of counsel defense. At the hearing on Trustee's motion to compel Altman's document production on December 19, 2017, Curlee stated he and Debtor who was then representing himself in this case had reached an agreement that Debtor was withdrawing his advice of counsel defense, recited the agreement on the record, and Debtor indicated his assent on the record and did not otherwise object to the agreement. Audio File of Hearing on Trustee's Motion to Compel, December 19, 2017. Based on this agreement, the court stated that the assertion by Altman on behalf of Debtor of the attorney-client privilege stands, and the court would not order enforcement of

2

4

5

7 8

6

9

11

12 13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

21

2223

2425

2627

28

Trustee's document subpoenas to Altman because Debtor was withdrawing the advice of counsel defense. *Id.* This court therefore ordered that Debtor was not to present any evidence at trial regarding an advice of counsel defense (Docket No. 81).

64. At trial and despite the court's order barring the advice of counsel defense, Debtor repeatedly attempted to assert an advice of counsel defense. *See, e.g.,* Debtor's Response to Trustee's Notice of Lodgment of Order in Adversary Proceeding to Revoke the Debtor's Discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) and (2) and for Fraudulent Acquisition of Assets, Docket No. 114, filed on June 14, 2018 (attaching copies of attorney-client communications). As Debtor waived his advice of counsel defense, the court hereby excludes any testimony, evidence, or argument presented by Debtor at trial or in closing argument on the advice of counsel defense. ⁴

Debtor's email to his attorney, Altman, on November 9, 2015 indicates an apparent misunderstanding of Debtor about his commissions when he wrote Altman, "When we met on 10/4 you asked me if someone owed me commissions. I understood that if contingency time frames had not passed, technically speaking a commission is not owed." Exchange of Emails between Debtor and His Bankruptcy Attorney, Anerio V. Altman, November 9 and 10, 2015, Ex. D-19. This may explain Debtor's reasoning why he did not tell Altman about the commissions, but this explanation is inconsistent with Debtor listing the amount of \$9,500.00 for the W L Street commission on the bankruptcy petition and schedules filed on October 5, 2019 because Debtor must have understood that the pending commissions needed to be listed as assets in listing the \$9,500.00 for W L Street. The email exchange on November 9, 2015 took place after the first meeting of creditors on that day when Trustee told Debtor's appearance attorney to amend the schedules to list open commissions and Altman was following up to ask Debtor about open commissions to amend the schedules. The email exchange of November 9 and 10, 2015 between Debtor and Altman only referred to the W L Street, Banning and Oceanside sales commissions, and not the Sandison commission. The first reference to the Sandison commission in the emails between Debtor and Altman is Altman's email to Debtor asking Debtor on February 9, 2016 at 8:49 a.m.: "SANDISON Escrow opened 7/31/15, Closed 8/31/15, I don't even see a payment to Long Beach Realty here. Why was this included? How did you or Long Beach Realty get paid?" Debtor's Response to Trustee's Notice of Lodgment of Order in Adversary Proceeding to Revoke the Debtor's Discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) and (2) and for Fraudulent Acquisition of Assets, Docket No. 114, filed on June 14, 2018, Ex. 2. This email communication is inadmissible and may not be considered part of the evidentiary record because as discussed above, Debtor had waived the advice of counsel defense, but even considering it, the tone and language of the email indicates that Altman was not previously aware of the Sandison commission. The admissible evidence in the case including the bankruptcy schedules and Exhibit D-19 indicate that

- 65. The court sustains Trustee's objections to Defendant's Exhibit D-16, Exchange of Emails between Debtor and His Bankruptcy Attorney, Anerio V. Altman, on January 29, 2016, and Exhibit D-17, Exchange of Emails between Debtor and His Bankruptcy Attorney, Anerio V. Altman on December 16, 2015 and July 8 and 7, 2016, which the court finds are attorney-client privileged communications which Debtor did not permit Trustee to have pretrial discovery of in not agreeing to waive the attorney-client privilege for Altman to produce their attorney-client communications. Trustee's objections to Defendant's Exhibit D-19, Exchange of Emails between Debtor and His Bankruptcy Attorney, Anerio V. Altman on November 9 and 10, 2015 are sustained in part. Defendant's Exhibit D-19 is admitted, but only for purposes of showing that Debtor disclosed the existence of the Commissions (i.e., W L, Banning and Oceanside only) to his attorney on November 9, 2015.
- 66. The court also finds that any reliance by Debtor on advice of counsel was not taken in good faith. *See In re Adeeb*, 787 F.2d at 1343. The advice of counsel defense is narrowly construed and is not a defense when erroneous information should have been self-evident. *In re Retz*, 606 F.3d at 1199 (citing *Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully)*, 818 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1987)). "A debtor cannot, merely by playing ostrich and burying his head deeply enough in the sand, disclaim all responsibility for statements which he has made under oath." *In re Tully*, 818 F.2d at 111.
- 67. Based on the court's findings above, the court finds Debtor's actions were neither reasonable nor undertaken in "good faith" reliance on advice of counsel. Debtor acted knowingly and fraudulently to hide the receipt and expenditure of the Commissions from Trustee. Moreover, the evidence shows Debtor did not act in good faith after disclosing the W. L Street, Banning and Oceanside Commissions to his attorney in their email exchange on November 9 and 10, 2015, and particularly in regard

Altman was only aware of the W L Street, Banning and Oceanside commissions when he asked Debtor about open commissions to amend the schedules in response to Trustee's instruction to the appearance counsel at the first meeting of creditors on November 9, 2015.

1

5

4

7

8

6

9 10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24 25

26 27

28

to the Sandison Sales Commission (the receipt of which he disclosed at trial on January 11, 2018), none of which were disclosed to Altman in the November 9 and 10, 2015 email exchange, and which were not disclosed to Trustee until trial.

- 68. Accordingly, based on the entire record of this case, the court finds that Trustee as Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both elements of 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1), and in reviewing the evidence cumulatively, the relief requested on Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is warranted. Defendant's discharge will be revoked pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1).
- 69. Accordingly, based on the entire record of this case, the court finds that Trustee as Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both elements of 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2), and in reviewing the evidence cumulatively, the relief requested on Plaintiff's seventh cause of action is warranted. Defendant's discharge will be revoked pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2).
- 70. Counsel for Trustee is hereby ordered to lodge a separate judgment consistent with these findings of fact and conclusions of law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

###

Date: March 27, 2019

Robert Kwan

United States Bankruptcy Judge